Source: http://www.armenianweekly.com/2012/01/25/akcam-genocide-recognition-is-about-justice-not-freedom-of-thought 

Q. What is your opinion, not about the genocide denial law itself, but about the
effects it can have on the debate among intellectuals and civil society in Turkey?

A. As the saying goes, there’s no such thing as bad publicity. Although, in the short run,
the French law has been very negatively received in Turkey, I believe that in the long run,
the effect will be positive. Within its own borders, Turkey can try and continue to suppress,
and muzzle, and deny the truth, but internationally there will be continual reminders (such
as the French law) of an issue that Turkey must confront and ultimately resolve.

Even if one opposes this legal initiative, it shows that Turkey cannot escape by sticking its
head in the sand. For this reason, the French initiative cannot be considered as a simple
“law” in the technical sense of the term for France. For better or worse, it has become part
of the international campaign to recognize the Armenian Genocide.

Turkey’s hysteria, and anger, and temper tantrums will pass and some of the negative
developments that have occurred will be quickly forgotten. What will remain is the heavy
reality of a very serious unresolved problem. Such an outcome will, I expect, support the
position of those intellectuals who assert that confronting and remembering history is
strongly connected to the creation of a democratic society.

Regardless of France’s ultimate aims or intentions, Turkish society and its educated
classes are once again reminded that we need to resolve this very fundamental issue.
Some may object that “this should have happened some other way,” but if you don’t
solve your problems on your own, often enough someone else will force a solution on
you. That’s the way it’s always been in this world.

Everyone has to realize this basic fact: On the subject of 1915, Turkey has followed a
politics of purposeful amnesia and delaying tactics. Turkey has swept the issue under
the rug, buried it and pretended it didn’t exist, all in the hopes that everyone’s memory
would be short and the whole thing would be forgotten. This is what they’ve been doing
for about a hundred years.

Every year after April 24^th, the commentary in most of the daily newspapers is something
along the lines of “Whew, great, we got through another year of this.” With 2015 approaching,
the tactic is the same. They know the subject is going to be brought up, especially abroad,
and everything is geared towards getting through 2015 with the least amount of damage.
That’s why there’s so much anger towards France’s law. Turkey is angry at being reminded.
Such memory is a ghost that has haunted them for decades.

I’ve been dealing with the Armenian Genocide topic for many years now, but when it comes
up with other Turkish intellectuals, I’ve always sensed a certain lack of interest, as if to say,
“Where’d you come up with this problem, anyway? Don’t we have enough issues to deal with?”
For them the subject has always seemed a bit unreal, inauthentic, and imposed from the outside.

My international colleagues speak of my “courage” to pursue this subject in the face of
“threats and dangers” from Turkey. However, that has never really been my problem. My
biggest challenge was loneliness. I have had a hard time trying to explain the significance of
1915 even to my closest friends in Turkey. In 1997, I wrote an essay titled, “Walking around
like a leper in my own country.” That’s how I felt—like a leper, a pariah. It wasn’t a matter of
“fear” and “courage.” What bothered me the most was their indifference, their lack of interest,
and the resulting alienation and loneliness I felt.

When I’d depart from Turkey, since my flight usually took off at around 5 a.m., I would stay up
all night talking with Hrant Dink. Every one of those conversations revolved around our loneliness.
We felt that no one seemed really interested in understanding and listening to us. The question
that we most often struggled with was, “How can we reach our friends and acquaintances so
that they see just how important this subject really is?” One of Hrant’s biggest challenges was
isolation. In the end, his alienation by and from us, Turkish intellectuals, was a contributing
factor in his murder.

Hrant’s death was a turning point. Turkish intellectuals took more interest in the events of 1915.
We began to understand that 1915 has even more to do with today than with the past. Gradually,
the connection between democracy-building and human rights, on the one hand, and
remembering and confronting history, on the other, became clearer and more acceptable across a
broader swath of Turkish society.

The civil-democratic activism that coalesced after Hrant’s death played an important role in this
change. However, this emergent opposition is still lacking in strength. I believe that we still need
much more external pressure. That is where the French law comes in.

Q. Do you think international pressure is positive or negative on Turkey? Don’t you
fear it will lead Turkey to a more nationalist, defensive approach? 

A. I am reminded of an incident on Jan. 4 or 5, 2007. The prosecutor’s office at Sisli, in an effort
to put pressure on Hrant’s legal defense, had targeted me for investigation because of an article
in which I’d used the word “genocide.” After giving the prosecutor my statement, I headed over to
the Agos newspaperoffice. Hrant and I were chatting. As in the past, he was criticizing France’s
initiatives.

“Stop, Hrant,” I told him. “If France weren’t taking this initiative, no one here would be holding a
microphone to your mouth. Don’t forget,” I added, “the only reason people know who you are is
because France keeps up this business with the law. If people outside the country weren’t doing
this you’d have a lot of trouble finding anyone willing to listen to you.”

“You’re right,” he admitted. “The only time it’s remembered is when there is outside pressure.”

This is something that the West needs to realize. It just isn’t possible to change Turkey’s
position regarding the subject of 1915 based solely on internal democratic opposition. Turkish
democratic and civil society activists don’t possess that kind of strength. The assassination of
Hrant Dink is evidence of this weakness. Today, there’s a very genuine activist movement that
goes by the name “Friends of Hrant” that has gained significant public support in Turkey, yet
Hrant’s real murderers still roam the country freely.

Those countries that condone and enable Turkey’s politics of denial for their own economic,
political, and strategic advantage should understand one thing: “Denial” is a structure. To understand
why Turkey continues to deny what happened in 1915, you should compare it with the racist
regime of South Africa. The institutions, system, and mindset of apartheid were established upon
racial differences, and the denial of genocide is similar. By denying what happened in 1915,
Turkey reproduces the institutions, social relations, and mindset that created 1915.

Genocide denial goes beyond the defense of a former regime whose institutions and mindset
were realized as genocide in the past. Denial also fuels a politics of continuing aggression,
both inside and outside Turkey, against anyone who opposes the denialist mentality. This is
why Hrant Dink’s actual murderers are still at large. This is why attacks are organized against
Armenians and their memorials in Europe. This is why in America campaigns of hate and hostility
are organized against me and other intellectuals.

What should be clear to everyone is this: In Turkey, genocide denial is an industry. It is also
a state policy of primary importance. The National Security Council, Turkey’s highest
constitutional authority, established in 2001 a Coordinating Committee for the Fight Against
Baseless Claims of Genocide. All of the important ministries, including the Armed Forces,
are represented on this committee, which is chaired by the vice prime minister. I repeat:
Denying the genocide is one of the most important national policies of the Turkish state.
You need to realize that you aren’t just confronting a simple “denial,” but you’re up against
a “denialist regime.”

As long as Turkey continues this state policy of genocide denial through its institutions,
relations, and mentality, Ankara will be sensitive to external pressure. In fact, this pressure
should be increased. What happened in Libya and Syria needs to happen in Turkey also,
with regard to genocide denial, even if the content and scope of the pressure are different.

If the West is serious about democracy in the Middle East, it cannot build democracy by
supporting a denialist regime. Historical denial, both as institution and mindset, is probably
the greatest stumbling block to peace and democracy in the Middle East. Why do Christians,
Kurds, and Arabs in Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq feel intimidated by Turkey? Why aren’t they
keen on Turkey’s intervention for democracy and human rights? Because they see, in today’s
denialist regime of Turkey, the Unionists’ mentality that committed crimes against them in the past.

The South African regime didn’t collapse from internal pressure alone. The support of international
public opinion was also very important. As long as the West allows Turkey’s denialist politics to
continue, genocide denial will go on.

We are faced with the huge issue of how to prevent mass murders and genocides in today’s
global community. To that end, the space for genocide denial in the international arena must
be narrowed and ultimately eliminated. Turkey’s denial policy should be reconsidered within
this perspective of prevention of genocide in the global world.

Yes, it’s always possible that external pressure may have negative consequences. History
provides examples of this. We must remember not to go to extremes. If we take the position
that external pressure is always bad, we play into the hands of dictators who would like
nothing better than to perpetuate their crimes with impunity. The apartheid regime of
South Africa, Latin American dictatorships, and the repressive Arab regimes have all taken
this attitude. On the other hand, if we say, “It doesn’t matter what’s going on internally, we’re
going to impose change from the outside,” the most disgraceful example is the invasion of Iraq.
So we need to stay away from either extreme. Instead of asking, “Yes or no to external pressure?”,
we should be asking, “What kind of external pressure?”

The refusal to exert pressure is another position to be avoided. For example, the West (especially
the U.S. and UK) have created their own kind of “external pressure” model based on their own
calculations. For the sake of perceived economic, political, and military strategic interests, they
turn a blind eye to a denialist regime. Their refusal enables Turkey to swagger, bully, and
threaten other countries. This must stop. Turkey will not give up its denial policy without
external pressure.

Actually, what I want is in Turkey’s best interest. In the end, what outcome could be better
than the creation of a society that respects democracy and human rights and that confronts
its history without shame? I have a hard time understanding what could possibly be negative
about creating external pressure towards this end.

Opponents will counter that external pressure is not motivated by a desire to bring democracy
to Turkey. They will say that the West exerts pressure in order to limit Turkey’s power. Is
there a grain of truth in this outlook? Of course there is, but the remedy is simple: Don’t let
others limit you. If you don’t want them to use your faults against you, then correct those faults
so they can’t. Do your homework. No country has ever been hurt by democracy or respect
for human rights.

I’m pushing 60 years of age, and by now, I’m sick and tired of these “external pressure”
arguments. In the 1980’s, Turkey’s military regime was supported for the same reason and
thousands of people were killed, tortured, or thrown in jail. Turkish generals were like the
West’s spoiled brats, killing as they pleased. They hated any kind of pressure, didn’t want
anyone “meddling in their internal affairs.” The same game is being played over the “denial
of history.”

Moreover, the really important question isn’t even “What kind of external pressure?” We
must ask how this external pressure will establish a healthy and positive relationship with
the internal democratization process. The biggest problem right now is incompatibility and
lack of harmony. Positive communication channels must be created between Turkey’s
domestic, democratic opposition and the world beyond its borders. Real dialogue has yet
to be established between internal and external activist groups that must unite in order to
change the denialist regime. Looking at France, I can say that what we have here is a
dialogue of the deaf.

I can’t say whether France’s indifference to Turkey’s democratic opposition has anything
to do with it, but the nationalist leanings of Turkish intellectuals definitely play a role in this
futile dialogue between parties who cannot hear each other. A very significant majority of
Turkish intellectuals still views any foreign initiative with a great deal of suspicion and doubt.
This attitude feels so natural to them that unfortunately they have no idea that it springs from
a deep well of nationalist tendencies.

Turkish national identity has from the beginning been defined in opposition to the “terrible
West that wants to meddle with our internal affairs from outside.” Undoubtedly, when one
looks at the history of Ottoman Turks, one can hardly claim that the West played a positive
role. However, the damage done by the West was not limited to meddling with the Ottomans
for colonialist self-interest. On the contrary, the West committed a great error in not having
interferedenough. A whole series of Western interventions against the Ottomans throughout
the 19^th century were critically important in the formulation of what we now call international
law. In other words, we need to re-examine the idea that “all external pressure is wrong.”

During Turkey’s bid for European Union membership, Turkish intellectuals and the society,
in general, softened their stance against “foreign interference.” Turkish society understood
that outside pressure, especially by the European Greens or some of the other left wing
parties, was not motivated solely by malice. In fact, it was accepted as a positive influence.
The same kind of acceptance must be generated towards the concept of genocide recognition.

In today’s globally connected world, the whole idea of “external” and “internal” is very problematic.
We must create a global awareness of genocides and their prevention without making these
distinctions of “external” and “internal.” Genocide denial and the struggle against it are part of
global democracy and human rights. You can’t speak of it as “external.” Recognition is an issue
relevant to all of humanity.

Q. Since you published a Shameful Act, it opened a door in Turkey, there’s been an
evolution on the 1915 issue in Turkey. How do you see the debate in Turkey? What’s
your opinion about the different initiatives that have appeared recently [April 24
commemorations, the ozur diliyoruz campaign, the conference in Diyarbakir]? Do
you hope for eventual recognition of the genocide from Turkey? 

A. Turkey’s domestic opposition should be taken more seriously. A group of individuals are
in the thick of an honorable struggle that truly deserves more respect. Although Hrant Dink’s
death was a turning point of sorts, they still don’t receive enough international support or
interest. No one’s asking them, “How are you doing? What do you need?”

Even if the draft bill in France came to be as the product of differing interests, even if it is
disregarded, I wish those working for the law in France would ask Turkish grassroots activists
what they think of such an initiative. I would like to see this as a starting point for dialogue.
This channel of communication hasn’t been opened and should be built as soon as possible.

A major reason the “bridge” hasn’t been built is the complete lack of interest outside of
Turkey, particularly by the Armenian Diaspora, in Turkey’s growing democratization. Indeed,
despite the pro-democracy movement’s positive aspects and successes, the struggle within
Turkey will get nowhere on its own. The “denial coalition and industry” can’t be changed by
domestic pressure alone, but it can be defeated if—and only if—the internal opposition joins
forces with a harmonious and balanced external pressure.

Dialogue between Turkey’s civil activists and the worldwide struggle for “genocide recognition”
is urgently needed. One reason it has yet to be initiated is the decades-old mutual prejudices
about ethno-religious and other social attributes. Also, Turkey’s civil activists have yet to
appreciate the significance of genocide recognition within their own democracy struggles.
While Turkish activists perceive international demands for genocide recognition as distractions
or obstacles to their own agenda, a large portion of the diaspora fails to appreciate the strong
bond between genocide recognition and democracy-building in Turkey. If anything, they tend
to belittle and underestimate this process.

However, I don’t want to lay too much blame on either side. In truth, the issue goes beyond
mutual perceptions of malice or benevolence. An even deeper problem is actually that the sides
are struggling for disparate goals.

Genocide recognition, in essence, is about justice, not freedom of expression or thought. A
democratic or free society, such as France or the U.S., may still have unresolved historical
injustices, for example towards Algeria or Native Americans. Turkish civil society still believes
that its own problems are due to limitations on the freedom of thought. Other goals, such as
justice and confronting history, are dismissed as unaffordable luxuries or deferred to some
imaginary future. Hence the negative reaction to demands for simple truth and justice.

This is the dilemma that must be surmounted. Justice and confronting history can be achieved
only with the establishment of a free and democratic society. The campaign for “truth and justice”
and the movement for “freedom and democracy” are not mutually exclusive, nor should they
result in confrontation. Quite the contrary, they are, and ought to be, inseparable goals. The
demands of the diaspora and Turkish society must be brought together. The duty to build bridges
between foreign and domestic civil activism is the most urgent thing right now.

Med rösterna 127 mot 86 röstade franska senaten sent igår natt, 23 januari, för ett förbud
mot förnekande av Armeniska folkmordet, precis som den franska lagstiftningen förhåller sig till
Förintelsen av judar under andra världskriget.

Samma lag mot förnekelse av Förintelsen och folkmord finns i en rad andra europeiska länder,
nämligen Tyskland, Schweiz, Österrike, Rumänien, Polen, Luxemburg, Liechtenstein, Ungern,
Slovakien, Tjeckien, Israel. Här i Sverige är vi mån om yttrandefriheten och åsiktsfriheten, vilket
innebär att liknande lagar känns högst irrationella och mot våra grundläggande värderingar. Det
var av samma skäl som Sverige sa nej till EU:s lagstiftning om förbud mot förnekelse av
Förintelsen (april 2007). På den punkten kan man helt enkelt tycka att erfarenheten och
åsikterna om folkmord i Frankrike, Tyskland, Polen m.fl. skiljer sig än andra länder, bland dem
även Sverige.

Rent principiellt kan man hålla med om att liknande lagar inte borde förekomma och i enlighet
med principen om yttrandefrihet och åsiktsfrihet så borde även de ”felaktiga” åsikterna komma
till tals. Sedan är det upp till allmänheten och tilltron till allmänhetens sund förnuft att döma
och tillrättavisa felaktigheterna. Av samma skäl borde rasism och ultranationella åsikter vara
uppenbara felaktigheter som samhället borde fördöma och tillrättavisa, men ändå behöver vi
ha lagar som markerar detta. Värt att notera är att i sökandet efter reaktioner på den franska
senatens beslut så verkar det, förutom turkar, finnas endast en till grupp som kritiserar beslutet
med hänvisning till yttrandefrihet och det är ultranationalistiska sidor som likställer gårdagens
beslut med begränsningen att kunna förneka och ifrågasätta Förintelsen.

Frågan om Armeniska folkmordet, Turkiet och franska lagförslaget är dock mer komplicerat än
så. Här handlar det inte om den enskilda personens åsikt som även i framtiden kan i Frankrike
sitta och diskutera folkmordet och förneka det, utan det är den offentliga förnekelsen som
man vill komma åt. Precis som i Förintelsens fall så hade Armeniska folkmordet kunnat resultera
i en rättsprocess och krav på ersättning om det inte hade varit för den turkiska statens
förnekelsekampanj. Turkiska republiken som efterträdde Osmanska imperiet har i nästan 90 år
lyckats undkomma något som helst ansvar för de brott som begicks mot sin armeniska
befolkning under första världskriget och dessutom fortsätter att beskylla folkmordets överlevare,
diasporan, för samma anklagelser som då, bland annat smutskastning av Turkiet.

Man anklagar franska politiker för att lagförslaget egentligen handlar om röstfiske inför
presidentvalet då uppemot 400 000 armeniska röster utav en fransk-armenisk befolkning på
600 000 står på spel. Det kan mycket väl ligga en hel del i det påståendet, men man verkar
glömma att dessa 600 000 armenier är barn och barnbarn till offren för folkmordet som Turkiet
öppet förnekar och vägrar ansvar för deras förlorade föräldrar och släktingar, deras egendom
och land.

Vad gäller yttrandefriheten så är det ganska svårt att låta bli se det högst ironiska i den turkiska
kritiken. Man har ivrigt påpekat principerna om yttrandefrihet och huruvida man kommer att 
åtala alla turkar i Frankrike som kommer att förneka folkmordet. Samtidigt verkar man helt 
glömma det faktum att offentligt påtalande av folkmordet inne i Turkiet medför åtal enligt
paragraf 301 för ”skändning av turkiska staten”. Detsamma gäller Turkiets försök att sätta
munkavle på alla främmande länder som vill erkänna folkmordet som ett faktum.  Så sent som
igår skriver Vasabladet om det omfattande censur och försämringen av yttrandefrihet som nu
förekommer i Turkiet, medan flera rapporter om ökande antal fängslade turkiska journalister slår
larm om den oroväckande processen i landet. Mot denna bakgrund är det knappast yttrande-
friheten och åsiktsfriheten som är huvudargumentet i den turkiska protesten mot det franska
beslutet.

Forskningen måste vara fri och ska fortsätta även om mängden informationen som vi vet idag
om Folkmordet 1915 räcker mer än väl för att fastslå dess verklighet. Idag handlar forskningen
om folkmordet inte längre om huruvida det har ägt rum eller inte, utan om en bättre förståelse
av dess orsak, dynamik och eftergift. Det är bara en fråga om tid att turen kommer till den
rättsliga aspekten, ett grundläggande skäl till att Turkiet har sedan 1920-talet frenetisk
bekämpat ett erkännande av folkmordet. Då det inte finns någon preskribering på brott mot
mänskligheten (inte nödvändigtvis just folkmord) så är det inte konstigt att Turkiet gör sin
yttersta att förhala denna process, något man har lyckats väl i decennier.

Pressmeddelande
Stockholm, 17 januari 2012
Armeniska riksförbundet i Sverige
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www.armeniska.se 

Fem år sedan journalisten Hrant Dink mördades på öppen gata

Torsdagen den 19 januari 2012 är femårsdagen av mordet på den armeniske journalisten och
redaktören Hrant Dink som sköts till döds av Ogün Samast på öppen gata i Istanbul, Turkiet.
Den 17 januari 2012 avslutades den utdragna rättegångsprocessen i jakten på hans mördare,
en process som kritiserats för dess långsamhet, ineffektivitet och mörkläggning av eventuella
kopplingar till den turkiska staten.

Det har framkommit flera anklagelser om förstörda bevis, bland annat då utredningsmaterial om
en av de huvudmisstänkta, Erhan Tuncel, hade förstörts med hänvisning till ”statshemligheter”
innan domstolen hade möjlighet att undersöka det. När försvarsadvokaterna undersökte
inspelningarna från säkerhetskamerorna vid mordplatsen och jämfört telefonlistor insåg man att
de två huvudåtalade hade pratat med fem andra personer vid mordtillfället, vilket skulle med
största sannolikhet innebära att mördarna samarbetade med flera andra personer. Men när man
begärde ut samtalslistor från Turkiska telekommunikationsstyrelsen fick man veta att de inte
kunde hitta några nummer som kunde kopplas till de misstänkta. Detta trots det faktum att
försvaret kunde bevisa att en av de misstänkta hade fått 19 samtal vid mordstillfället från en
annan mobil i området. Snart försvann inspelningarna från säkerhetskameror på mordplatsen
och även förhörsdokument och hela intervjuakter beslagtogs och förstördes av säkerhets-
tjänsten.

Den 14 september 2010 fällde Europeiska domstolen för mänskliga rättigheter Turkiet för att
ha brustit i skyddandet av Hrant Dink. Säkerhetstjänsten och polisen visste om hotbilden och
det möjliga mordförsöket samt identiteten på anstiftarna. Ändå gjordes det inte något för att
ingripa. Europadomstolen uppmanade även Turkiet att undersöka säkerhetstjänstens, polisens
och andra statstjänstemäns inblandning i mordet, något som den turkiska domstolen och
åklagarämbetet hade vägrat göra. Europadomstolen anmärkte också att alla fall där stats-
tjänstemän hade varit misstänkta hade avbrutits mitt i processen och åtalen hade lagts ner.

Europadomstolens uppmaningar har dock inte haft någon verkan på det turkiska rättsväsendet.
Trots begäran från Dinks advokater om att domstolen inte ska avsluta rättsprocessen då
flera omständigheter i mordet är fortfarande inte uppklarade har man förkunnat ett slutgiltigt
domslut. I juli 2011 dömdes Samast till livstids fängelse, men domslutet omvandlades till 23 års
fängelse eftersom han var minderårig (17) vid mordtillfället. Igår, den 17 januari, då domstolen
avslutade sitt arbete med fallet, dömdes ytterligare en person för medhjälp till livstids fängelse,
men man fastslog att mordet inte var en organiserad aktion, trots uppenbara bevis på att
minst fjorton personer hade varit i kontakt med de huvudmisstänkta.

Angående domslutet har Dinks son, Arat Dink, via en av familjens advokater hälsat att ”De
skämtade med oss tidigare, men de behöll det största skämtet till slutet. Domstolen sa att
mordet inte var ett organisera brott. Jag förväntade mig inte det. Beslutet visar att statens
tradition om trakasseringen av sina egna medborgare och att göra dem till sina fiender
fortsätter”. Dinks bror, Yervant Dink har sagt att ”Kanske var det här bättre, eftersom staten
har visat sin egen officiella ansikte.” Huruvida familjen Dink driver frågan vidare kvarstår att se.

Armeniska riksförbundet i Sverige fördömer det som av flera medier, Amnesty, olika journalist-
förbund och människorättsorganisationer samt Europadomstolen för mänskliga rättigheter kallat
för en skenrättegång och uppenbar mörkläggning av omständigheterna och den turkiska
statens möjliga inblandning i mordet på Hrant Dink. Armeniska riksförbundet fortsätter att
högtidlighålla minnet av Hrant Dink och hans arbete samt att kräva en transparent och rättvis
rättegång som hittar samtliga skyldiga till tystandet av en reformvänlig röst inne i Turkiet.

En minnesceremoni kommer att hållas till Dinks minne 18:00-19:00, torsdagen 19 januari 2012
Plats: ABF-huset, plan 1, Sveavägen 41, Stockholm.